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When people talk of the freedom of writing, speaking, or
thinking, I cannot choose but laugh. No such thing ever existed.
No such thing now exists; but I hope it will exist. But it must be
hundreds of years after you and I shall write and speak no more.
- John Adams, 1818 letter to Thomas Jefferson
I am smashing up the old Fada - I shall change everything
and everybody in it. I am abolishing the old ways, the old ideas,
the old law; I am bringing wealth and opportunity for good as
well as vice, new powers to men and therefore new conflicts. I am
the revolution, I am giving you plenty of trouble already, you
governors, and I am going to give you plenty more. I destroy, and
I make new. What are you going to do about it? I am your idea.
You made me, so I suppose you know.
-  Joyce Cary, Mister Johnson
The Disenchantment Of Southeast
Asia: New Media And Social
Change Post 9/11
Jonathan Woodier
Freelance Journalist, Singapore
Although governments around Southeast Asia bemoan their failing
ability to control the flow of news and information in the Internet age,
the terrorist attacks on the US and, in particular, those in Bali in October
2002, are likely to provide a fillip for the region’s hard-liners, and
underpin surveillance states in the region.  As culture becomes a major
factor in national security and international relations, the role of the
media and communications technology in political change  has become
ambiguous. The Internet allows the high-tech mobilisation of radical
constituencies, and threatens to shake dominant political visions and
cultural traditions to the core.  Although technology has allowed a greater
share of voice for the disillusioned, the dispossessed and the
disadvantaged, it is also an effective weapon in the hands of the state.
With Southeast Asia’s silent majority prepared to sacrifice gains in
democratic pluralism in return for security, the war on ‘terror’ will
allow authoritarian governments to reel in many of the gains in freedom
of speech only recently won and further alienate the Malay-Islamic
communities, driving them into the arms of militant radicals.
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Southeast Asia is trying to come to terms with globalisation in itslatest reincarnation, a blend of modernity and speed.  Its societies
are grappling with issues of governance, the shape of institutions
like the media, and the possible ramifications of some of
globalisation’s general trappings that are seen to smack of the West:
reactionary, decadent and deceitful.  The search for answers has led
to a tremendous richness in response but, as regional instability
mounts in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the United States,
it is a struggle the region may be losing in an irrevocable process of
change, conflict and breakdown.
As governments in the region open up their economies in an
attempt to reap some of the financial benefits of being part of the
global information economy, they find themselves helpless in the
face of the forces of change that are riding roughshod over their
societies, with serious social and political ramifications.  For while
information technology has boosted productivity, growth and job
creation in industrialised countries, its benefits have gone beyond
the economic sphere. Its power has extended to politics as well.
Despite the unequal distribution of the new communication
technology, its falling costs mean that dissidents have increasing
access to it to challenge established structures of authority.  It is
undermining established communities as it creates new ones,
particularly where it “articulates a mood of dissent” (Sorlin, 1994:
33-35).
From satellite television and financial data to the ‘emoticons’
beloved of the oyayubizoku, the thumb tribes of Japan, and SMS, the
information economy is ensuring “the intensification of world-wide
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and
vice versa” (Giddens, 1990:64). Information is racing round the world
at “netspeed” (Friedman, 2000: 218). But rather than proving the
ruling social science paradigm of an “inexorable liberal-democratic
end of history…[where] economic progress inevitably presaged
eventual liberalization and democratization” (Jones & Smith, 2001:
855), the collision of computing, always-on communications and
physical mobility is ambiguous in its effects. It enables people power
in the Philippines and the wherewithal for the rise of techno-terrorism
just as easily provides for the rise of the “surveillance state” (Jones
& Smith, 2002), and the erosion of privacy from the encroachment of
government and commercial interests.
Where once the dissemination of information served as an
integral part of nation building and political control, unfettered access
and increasingly porous national borders are providing a challenge
to established regimes in Southeast Asia.  It is a development that
has not been lost on the elites in the region.  They are falling over
themselves in the rush to contest and reclaim the media space, in an
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attempt to control the changes sweeping through their societies.
Governments and others have long been keen to control
technologies such as the Internet through laws and regulations,
just as the wrangling over data protection has been ongoing since
the birth of information technology (IT).
Their success has tended to be limited and constrained both
by technological ability and by the political culture in which the
intrusions take place. The debate over individual privacy, while
not new, has not only met difficulties such as problems of
definition, but different positions on the relationship between the
state and the individual.  After the 9/11 attack on the World Trade
Centre, however, the debate takes place against a changing political
environment, in which a number of trends have been identified.
These trends include increased communications surveillance and
search and seizure powers; weakening of data protection regimes;
increased data sharing; and increased profiling and identification.
While none of these policies are new, it is “notable” the speed
with which many of them “gained acceptance and, in many cases
pushed through to law” (Privacy International, 2002).
Thus, the Internet can be added to the list of “collateral
damage” caused by the general spate of security interests, as the
anti-terrorism drive threatens Internet freedoms worldwide
(Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2002). Many governments are using the
pretext of the ‘war on terror’ to curb basic freedoms or crack down
on their domestic opponents using the Internet, leading, it is
claimed, to an “unprecedented abuse” of individual rights and
freedoms (Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2002). But, as the blast from
October’s bombs in Bali echoes around the region, governments
seem unable to contain internal unrest amidst deepening economic
troubles and a turbulent sea of social change, raising the question
as to whether or not Southeast Asia’s models of authoritarian
control can survive.
This paper, then, will consider the implications of the impact
of the Information Age and its attendant communications
technology on Southeast Asia.  It will look at the sea change in
mass media and communications in the region, such that the
communication media is no longer a tool of national governments
alone, but is now increasingly accessible to the ordinary citizen,
with dramatic consequences for the political and social fabric of
Southeast Asia.
It will consider how transnational crime syndicates bent on
piracy or perfidy can use the globalised communication
infrastructure.  It will consider how the same technology networks
terrorist and democratic movements, and how the ‘war on
terrorism’ following the attacks of 11 September 2001, is giving
governments in the region, an excuse to crack down on free
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expression and political dissent on the Internet.  Finally, in the face
of a rise of the surveillance state, it will discuss how many citizens
are prepared to exchange their hard won rights and freedoms for
convenience and security, while frustrated minorities are being
pushed into the hands of militant fundamentalists.
Those seeking to curb the flow of digital traffic are likely to find
that they have growing support both internally, from the quiet
majority seeking protection and, externally, from the West.
Nevertheless, in the Information Age, modern global activism - from
campaigns to save the world’s oceans to those which seek the violent
destruction of global capitalism and American hegemony - is
intricately linked to IT, that is more accessible than ever before.  The
centrality of a globalised communications media in everyday life
and the fact that the new media, in particular, enables those less
constrained by the precedents of tradition to challenge established
forms of power and authority, is leading in Southeast Asia to a
compounding of the region’s security dilemmas.
The beginning of 2003, brought the announcement of what was
claimed to be the first terrorism research centre in the Asia-Pacific,
to be set up in Singapore by the end of the year (Rekhi, 2003). This
news marked the latest in a flurry of regional security meetings,
discussions of intelligence sharing, even agreements on regional
police forces (Sharma 2002), which followed in the wake of 9/11.
Before the 9/11 attacks on the US, progress with the
institutionalisation of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region had been “very slow, painful and frustrating” (Ball
2000). After the attack on the US, regional powwows took on a more
urgent flavour.  In Southeast Asia, the failure to recognise the extent
of the coherence and cohesion of the politically radicalised Islamic
opposition in their own backyard (Jones & Smith, 2002), brought the
issue further to the fore, although substantive agreements still seemed
tantalisingly out of reach (Christoffersen, 2002).  The Bali bombs,
which directly threatened both the economies and regime stability
in the region and brought a previously recalcitrant Indonesian
government to the ‘war of terror’ alliance, should serve to focus the
mind yet further.
This preoccupation with the inner threat should be no surprise.
Security is an overriding concern for Southeast Asia’s elites, and a
key consideration when explaining their behaviour (Ayoob, 1995:
191; Job, 1992: 66).  They belong to relatively new states, many of
which only became independent in the 1950’s and 1960’s. State
building is still an ongoing process and internal security is an
obsession.  So, not only are the perceptions of the elites and the
regimes involved in the state-building important in defining security
Information
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problems (Ayoob, 1995: 191), but there is also a blurring of the
lines between state and regime security, and a “predisposition to
conceive of national security as regime security” (Samudaranija,
et al, 1987: 12).
A colonial inheritance of “discontinuities and distortions”
(Job, 1992: 69), has often resulted in low regime legitimacy as well
as deep fissures in the social fabric of the new states, causing
“domestic insecurity” (Ayoob, 1995: 190).  These fissures can be
ethnic, religious, or economic, and they often coincide, further
weakening national foundations.
These new states are also vulnerable to external pressures
due to their relatively weak position on the global stage.
Interference from institutions like the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank (both dominated by the major industrial
powers), as well as from the advanced industrialised states and
multinational corporations, adds to the destabilising effects of the
ideas and values bound up in the process of modernisation
(Ayoob, 1995: 37).
Thus, their lack of autonomy and the permeability creates an
environment of increased insecurity, preoccupying the elites with
trying to counter these external pressures. In doing so, however,
they face certain security dilemmas, particularly when regime
legitimacy is linked to overall security and prosperity.  The pursuit
of economic development creates further instability: they have to
weigh cross border information flows against information control;
global advertising and consumerism against national financial
needs; foreign ideas and values against traditional mores and
beliefs.  The porosity of the state increases, further diminishing
its autonomy, as it becomes a part of the global economy
(Samudaranija & Paribata, 1987: 12; Job, 1992: 4-5).
Moreover, just as global economic development is uneven,
so different groups within the state prove more able and more
prepared to embrace the changes this development entails. The
social transformation results in challenges for the regime, from
the emergence of new interest groups, internal migration, and a
younger, more demanding, literate, educated and increasingly
urban population.  Many also feel dislocated and disenfranchised
by the changes around them: uncomfortable and unsuccessful in
the new and the modern, they turn back to traditional value
systems, causing further conflict (Samudaranija, et al, 1987: 6-9).
The fact that the US and its allies are prepared to brush aside
notions of national sovereignty in pursuit of ‘terrorists’ in the post
9/11 world, is a forcible reminder of these feelings of insecurity,
as well as a further source of alienation for increasing numbers of
the region’s youth. The Bali tragedy placed the war on ‘terror’
firmly on the doorsteps of Southeast Asia’s government and, all
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the while, the media, in particular the new media, is seen as carrying
change to the heart of these societies.
In the Information Age, where communications technology is
available at ever-cheaper rates, a globalised mass media has reached
its tendrils into the fabric of Southeast Asian society, with ambiguous
and unpredictable consequences.  Technological developments and
the current round of global economic integration have further
ensured that the communication media has become increasingly
central in daily life in Asia.
In Southeast Asia, information was once the jealously-protected
ward of the local elites and the mass communication media had a
central role in nation building. Today, the international media giants,
seeking profitability through economies of scale, have taken their
place alongside local producers.  They have extended their reach
across Asia, eroding monolithic state ownership in an apparent
profusion of choice and ownership.
There is a paradox here, however. Although many Southeast
Asian governments might fear the links drawn by the modernisation
theorists between capitalist market development, the free flow of
information and the development of liberal institutions
(Huntington, 1991; Diamond & Plattner, Berger 1986; Lerner, 1958),
their worries in this area are generally unfounded. The elites in
Southeast Asia regularly rail against the international media, but
are proving that they can respond fairly effectively (Woodier, 2001;
Atkins 2002; Rodan 1998, 2000), as they attempt to retain control
over, or manipulate the flow of information flooding across their
borders.
It is, however, the depth and pace of the changes swept in by a
cultural firestorm, presaged in part by the explosion in the number
and reach of international media products and aided by the
proliferation of cheap communications technology, that has many
governments in the region in damage limitation mode. The wider
they open the doors to their economies in an attempt to reap some
of the financial benefits of being part of the global information
economy, the more they seem to fan the flames of modernity that
are licking at the social and political foundations of their societies.
Indeed, the developing ‘after image’ of the attacks in the US,
has not meant less globalisation. Where there has been a slow down
in traditional measurements such as foreign direct investment
(F.D.I.), a more nuanced portrayal of the situation shows an increase
in levels of both political and economic integration.  Beyond the
economy, global integration actually deepened on several levels.
The war on terrorism, for instance, is a key factor fuelling political
integration, and 11 September looks to be a “symptom rather than
IT And
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a cause of the stresses inherent in global integration”  (A.T.
Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine, 2003).
Despite the widely held fears of “the destruction of traditional
culture and values (under the code of modernisation), and [the
imposition of] a new kind of transnational, global consumer
culture…” (Kellner, 1990: 88) the media is not simply an avenue
down which march the imperial legions of cultural change
(Blumler & Gurevitch, 1996: 132-133). But, even though the
transnational content providers might be careful to ensure political
pitfalls do not pepper their path to profits, these are still products
that come with a built in slant.
As public spaces in Southeast Asian cities see a proliferation
of skateboard-wielding youths in their baseball caps and baggies,
it is clear that the message from the global media giants is
MacWorld and definitely not Jihad (Barber, 1995).  However, in
the converging currents of media reception it is not a matter of
MacWorld or Jihad: a member of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is just as likely
to pick up a McDonalds, while the burqhua often hides a Nike
‘swoosh’.  After all, media production and reception is a process
of “constant negotiation” (Macgregor, 1997: 53). The new media,
in particular, is a disruptive technology, and its role in cultural
transformation is both complicated and unpredictable (Thompson,
1995: 190).  The media can be used to extend and consolidate
traditional values, nourishing a sense of identity and sense of
belonging (Thompson, 1995: 194), while also serving to “shake
dominant political visions and cultural traditions to the core” (Lull,
1995: 114).
The mass communication media is at the centre of “new
modes of image production and cultural hegemony, the political
struggles of various groups and the restructuring of capitalist
society” (Kellner, 1990: 129).  Local elites see control of such a
potentially subversive space as vital, yet media production and
reception is subject to a growing  “struggle for availability and
for access” (Fiske, 1994: 4).
In this battle for control, the division of power and resources
is unequal, weighed towards ownership of the means production.
Yet other groups can negotiate access to media spaces, and are
becoming increasingly good at it.  Likewise, inequalities in terms
of access to the global networks of communications have not
prevented the emergence of local strategies of opposition, from
local cultural production to piracy, providing a “complex
syncopation of voices” (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1996: 180), around
the world.  These new technologies are supporting both a
concentration and a dispersion of power.
New media allow those on the periphery to develop and
consolidate power, and ultimately to challenge the authority of
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the centre. In this high-tech mobilisation of radical constituencies
(Wright, 2002), the voices often speak in opposition to globalisation,
fed by “its major discontents, nationalism, regionalism, localism
and revivalism” (Tehranian, 1999: 81), challenging the authority of
the centre and eliciting a response at an elite level.
In Southeast Asia, as regimes toppled in Thailand and
Indonesia in the 1990’s, the global communication media was
increasingly identified as an important cause of regional political
upheaval (Atkins, 1999: 420; 2002). The burgeoning media industry
does not sit easily with governments around the region, which are
used to controlling the flow of information within and across their
borders. Identified as a key variable in driving regional political
upheaval (Atkins, 1999: 420), these governments have been keen to
quarantine what many see as the source of a contagion of internal
instability (Ayoob, 1995: 196).
The post-colonial state’s nation-building ambitions and control
strategies have made Southeast Asia one of the most information
sensitive regions in the world, yet the 1980’s saw a loosening of
these controls (Atkins, 1999: i). With governments in the region just
as keen to reap the rewards of being part of the global economy as
they were to continue to control the flow of information across and
within their borders, policy confusion led to general growth in the
industry in Asia. But it has been the growth of the Internet in the
1990’s that has really complicated Southeast Asia’s government
efforts to control the flow of information.
US government moves to establish the information
superhighway marked an upping of the ante in the competition to
be a winner in the global economy (Langdale, 1997: 117).  In
response, governments across the region have tried to put the
Internet to use in developing their economies, as falling costs mean
access has become a reality for many in the region’s more developed
areas (Minges, 2001).
Despite the possible economic advantages, the perceived
political implications of embracing the information age remain a
concern to governments around the region. Even Singapore, a model
for control and constraint, appears to been losing its grip in the face
of recent technological developments, in particular, the growth of
the Internet.  The leadership of the seemingly indomitable ruling
Peoples Action Party (PAP), recently threw up its hands, exclaiming
that its sway over the communication media was slipping (Kuo &
Peng, 2000: 420).
However, where Southeast Asia is concerned, Singapore is
leading the way in successfully placing “strict restrictions on the
flow or market exchange” (Wong, 2001: 3) of information related
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commodities and related cultural products such as news, movies
and television programmes. There appear to be few cracks in a
system of control that continues to provide and model for other
authoritarian regimes in the region (Rodan, 2002:10).
Singapore has continued to compete at the highest levels.
From the Government’s “intelligent island” initiative (National
Computer Board, 1992), to more recent e-initiatives (including the
$S1.5-billion Infocomm 21 - <www.ida.com.sg>, the government
sought to exploit IT for economic growth, while working to
maintain its position as gatekeeper for information and media
access for its citizens.  Despite one of the highest computer and
Internet penetration rates in the world (Chen, 2001,
SBA.gov.sg.com), with a combination of technological, legal and
policing strategies, it has also led the way in the region in working
to control this new source of instability and dissent, and moved to
secure its gatekeeping role over the flow of information across
and within its border (Rodan, 2002: A11; Sesser, 1999: 1, 9; Gomez,
2002).
However, even in Singapore, the Internet is providing
additional and less controllable space for political expression not
necessarily sanctioned by the government.  While the established
local media and their international brethren know their place,
globalisation and rapid progress in mass communications
technologies, like the Internet, has provided “opportunities for
communication among civil society groups on a scale and in a
way which had not been possible before...” (Ooi, 2000: 192).
Lest the Singapore grip seems to slip too far, a criminal
defamation investigation launched in July 2002, against Muslim
rights activist Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff, was a clear indication
by the government of its intention to maintain control over the
Internet space.  Any commitment to deregulating Singapore’s
media and entertainment industry is more about securing the
wandering attention of Singapore’s youth than a move towards a
more pluralist system (Agence France-Presse, 2002)
Among Singapore’s ASEAN neighbours, attitudes to Internet
content tend to reflect the wider communication media
environment.  In the Philippines, the media is, by many established
criteria, one of the most robust in the world (Zubri, 1993: 187).
Discussion of the issues facing the Filipino media range from its
overriding influence and the scrutiny of media ownership and
control and its affect on editorial decisions, through the murder
and imprisonment of crusading journalists and poor quality work
and petty corruption, to sex selling the media and television news
being repackaged as entertainment, with ratings driving
production considerations.  But these discussions also tend to
mention the general health of the media, and positives such as the
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use of the Internet to continue the experiment with libertarian and
community journalism, and political debate.
Thailand and Indonesia both have a much less developed
infrastructure than Singapore.  Thailand’s Internet population is
seen as having the most potential growth within ASEAN, and is
expected to exceed both Malaysia and Singapore in size. At present,
however, access remains predominantly an urban phenomenon and
confined to the capital (Nielsen, 2001). Given the apparent
propensity of the country’s Prime Minister (PM) to “emulate the
slick authoritarianism of Singapore” (Rodan, 2002:10), similar moves
to fence off the Internet are likely. Not only has the PM’s Shin
Corporation got significant interests in the communications
infrastructure, but recent regulations imposed by the Ministry of
Communications and Transportation ensure the state-owned
Communications Authority of Thailand receives, free-of-charge, a
35% stake in all private Internet service providers (ISPs) (Swan,
2002: 21).
In Indonesia under Suharto, the Internet, which became
accessible in Indonesia from 1995, allowed the relatively free flow
of information in a tightly-controlled media environment.  Post
Suharto, the role of the Internet has weakened the regime’s tight
grip on the media.  The Internet is seen as playing a major role in
toppling the Suharto regime, and remains a technology of
democracy in the public imagination.  Its use in the 1999 election
process served further to “authenticate the newly-emerging
democracy in their eyes” (Hill, 2002: 5).  However, the days of an
unfettered Indonesian media are over, despite the 1999 law that
prohibits censorship. Four years after restrictions on free speech
ended with Suharto’s fall, there are fears a recent government
crackdown could signal a return to this nation’s repressive past
(Timberlake, 2002).
Given the propensities of its neighbours, one would expect
Malaysia’s policies, then, to be particularly restrictive. Malaysia has
a western-style media in form but not content:  “a sophisticated
combination of legislation and ownership concentration [have]
ensured the media remained under tight control” (Williams & Rich,
2000: 2). Malaysia, however, has probably been among the most
liberal in its policing of the online world, at least until now.  The
desire on the part of the Malaysian authorities to encourage the
development of its information industries and attract foreign players
to the Multimedia Super Corridor, meant the government of Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammed promised in 1996, not to censor the
Internet. As a result, the medium has become a focus for those
dissatisfied with the bias of the local conventional media. And,
despite one well-publicised court case (Ibrahim & Kaur 1998: 1),
Mahathir’s commitment not to censor the Internet appeared to hold
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true, at least until a government raid closed online news daily
Malaysiakini in early 2003.
Indeed, as part of the regional move to clampdown on the
free flow of information, the Malaysian Home Ministry has drawn
up plans to impose a “code of content” and a licensing system for
website operators. These proposals would enable authorities “to
discourage the abuse of the Internet by irresponsible users” and
to address national security concerns (Laurie, 2002; Loone, 2002;
ABC Asia Pacific, 2002).
Southeast Asian governments are not alone in working to
control the Internet in the Asian region.  China, in particular, shares
their schizophrenic attitude to the Internet, hoping to harness its
potential as a tool of state propaganda and to boost economic
growth, while reigning its use for expression of political opposition.
Beijing has also taken advantage of the international drive against
terrorism to strengthen the machinery of government and control
(Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2002).
China, which has some 45 million Internet users, about 3.6
per cent of the population (CNNIC, 2002; cited in Hennock, 2002),
has seen a move to block foreign web sites, the creation of an
Internet police force to monitor use, and the closure of sites with
articles on corruption or critical of the government.  Beijing has
also been working to contain the growth of cyber cafes, closing
more than 14,000 over the summer of 2002, and has detained some
30 Internet users for subversion, one of whom it imprisoned for
eleven years for downloading articles from the Internet.
Beijing has also managed to get ISPs and web sites to sign
self-censorship agreements. More than 300 organisations are
reported to have put their names to a pledge to discourage the
publication of ‘immoral’ or ‘dangerous’ material online.  This
included some celebrated agreements with US corporations such
as Yahoo  (Wong, 2002a; 2002b).
India also seems to have picked up this regional malaise. The
role of the Internet and IT in rural development, as well as its
contribution to broader economic gains, is well understood
(Sharma, 2003). But the nationalist government of Prime Minister
A.B. Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), also clearly
understands the threats posed by these disruptive technologies.
The ongoing troubles of online news portal, tehelka.com,
highlight not only the government’s growing discomfort with
criticism and awareness of the space provided by the Internet, but
also form a lightning rod for the ongoing debate over privacy and
the media.  The website’s owners blame their current cash shortage
on an alleged government campaign to deter potential investors.
The campaign, they suggest, stems from a story it ran in March
2001,which led to the resignation of senior defence officials,
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including a Cabinet minister and the chief of the BJP party. The site
obtained the evidence by way of a ‘sting operation’, where they
secretly recorded on video, army officers and politicians accepting
bribes from journalists posing as arms dealers (BBC, 2002b).
Where its neighbours in South Asia have always had a fraught,
if not downright nasty relationship between their elites and the
expression of opposition and dissent, India has been known for its
relatively liberal attitudes.  There are mounting concerns, however,
that the current government is taking a more authoritarian position.
Reporting on political issues, for example, has become risky for
journalists, particularly against a background of ongoing tensions
over border disputes with Pakistan, and Islamic and Marxist
separatists in the north-eastern states of Jammu and Kashmir
(Ahmad, 2002).
Between the IT Act of 2000 (policed by the ‘Cyber Crime
Investigation Cell’), and the March 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act,
the government certainly has the legal wherewithal to intercept
electronic communications.  The planned Electronic Research and
Development Centre, to develop new cyber forensic tools, is expected
to ensure it has the equipment it might need for a crackdown (Privacy
International & EPIC, 2002).
The hardening of attitudes towards the new media throughout
the region should be put in context.  “Larger, more diverse political
systems will not be able to simply replicate a Singapore model of
control…”, something which would require “the development of a
mutually reinforcing set of institutions comprehensively
subordinated to ruling party interests” (Rodan, 2002: 10).  Despite
this, the Singapore model will continue to inspire, inform and guide
authoritarian regimes in the region, particularly in the wake of 9/11
and the Bali Bombings.
Electronic surveillance: “Every move you make,
every breath you take…”
Admired though it is, the Singapore government is finding there
are drawbacks to its approach.  The government wants to
differentiate itself from its neighbours in Asia, and attract
international investors and global talent to help make its companies
winners (Saywell & Plott, 2002).  It wants to create an entrepreneurial
culture, currently stifled, although the government would not use
the term, by the aura of ‘authoritarian capitalism’. This “…suppresses
individualism and intellectual freedom and will greatly impair the
formation of entrepreneurs… [and] in the long run…[is] unlikely to
sustain the levels of high performance recorded in recent years”
(Lingle, 1998).
Whilst the Singapore government is keen to encourage its
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citizens to make money, it is not prepared to trust them with a
more plural system.  And, although Singaporeans have become
increasingly noisy, at least in Cyberspace, the American ‘war
against terror’ has provided Singapore’s governors with a useful
excuse for cementing over some of these cracks, as the moves in
July 2002 clearly showed.
Indeed, at the state’s recognition of the “premonitory
snufflings of civil society” (Jones, 1998: 163), it seems to step in
swiftly to ensure its political monopoly remains firm. In the post
9/11 world, this attitude might find some support from the most
unlikely quarters.  Asian values were once the talisman used by
governments around the region to ward off what they saw as the
worst effects of globalisation - the move towards liberal democracy
and the undermining of their authority.  The attacks on the US
and the global financial fallout from both the telecommunications
stock price meltdown and the Enron-inspired corporate scandals
have tested the commitment of even the strongest proponents of
globalisation. With many in the West now leery of its ramifications,
the ‘war on terror’ is further reinforcing the garrison-state
mentality, providing a fillip to authoritarianism and in conflict
with global, open media policies of the 90’s.
Of course, politics has not been the only context in which the
region is witness to a resurgence of surveillance and scrutiny. As
Southeast Asia’s citizenry migrates into the digital world, it leaves
its privacy behind in the analogue world, something that will only
be reinforced by the use of broadband.
In the broadband age, commercial imperatives rather than
political initiatives will drive much of the invasion into our privacy.
Most of us seem to shrug off these increasing incursions as a small
price to pay for convenience.  Every purchase we make is an
“electronic confession” (Dogg, 2001). Merely using a credit card
allows a bank, and anybody else who obtains access to the data,
to know where the credit card is being used. Likewise, advanced
mobile telephony might appear to be a convenience, but it also
means a user can be traced geographically, perfect for pushing an
advert for the latest sale in a nearby shopping mall.  Internet use
is subject to increasingly sophisticated methods to watch what
surfers are doing and to make e-commerce pay (Ward, 2002).
This is the stuff that oils the cogs of modern commercial life.
Similarly, the efforts of governments to provide e-citizens with
easy ways to pay bills, apply for licences and the like, mean that
as we interact with the modern capitalist system, so we register
our virtual existence on computers around the world.  Thus, many
of the innovations in communications technology come with huge
opportunities for surveillance. There are no hiding places on the
Net as governments around the world chase your data (Campbell,
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2000).
This is of course, meat for conspiracy theorists, and myths
abound about the abilities of governments to monitor our every
electronic word.  From Echelon - described by privacy groups as a
global surveillance network that intercepts all kinds of
communications for redistribution among the primary partners in
a decades-old UK-US alliance that also includes Australia and New
Zealand, to the FBI’s Carnivore - an Internet wiretap that looks at
packets and records those it considers suspect, the tools for almost
Orwellian surveillance possibilities seem to be in place (Oakes, 2002;
Poroskov, 2002; Darklady, 2002).
Most recently, reports have suggested the Pentagon is
developing a computer system that resembles a vast electronic
dragnet, trawling through personal information in the hunt for
terrorists around the globe.  The system is said to be being developed
under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
The New York Times named Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, the former
national security adviser in the Reagan administration infamous for
his role in the Iran Contra affair in the 1980’s, as project director.
Poindexter has described the system in Pentagon documents and in
speeches as providing intelligence analysts and law enforcement
officials with instant access to information from Internet mail and
calling records to credit card and banking transactions and travel
documents, without a search warrant (Markoff, 2002).  DARPA (2002)
brushed aside the story, in particular Poindexter’s association.
Myth or reality, the row over encryption, including calls by the
US authorities for a global ban on all encryption software, implies a
thread of truth worming its way through the tales of Echelon and
Carnivore.  What is more tangible is the Homeland Security Bill signed
by President George W. Bush on 25 November 2002, which
“effectively drafted corporate America to serve in the war against
terrorism—with Internet service providers among those on the front
line” (Swibel, 2002).  The law puts new burdens on ISPs to cooperate
with the government. For example, law enforcement agencies won’t
need a court order to install pen register and trap-and-trace devices
when there is an ‘ongoing attack’ on any computers used in interstate
commerce or communication.
And, the ISPs got something in return: The new law makes it
easier for the USA’s 3,000 Internet service providers to volunteer
subscriber information to government officials without worrying
about customer lawsuits. Under the new law, they can release the
contents of customers’ communications to law enforcement agencies
without a court order and without fear of a suit if they have a ‘good-
faith’ belief that an emergency warrants it. Before, they had to have
a ‘reasonable’ belief - a higher legal standard - that release was
warranted.
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But, it is not only digital communication that has risks for
our privacy, the widespread deployment of other surveillance
technology also has serious implications. We are monitored at
work, and in the streets.  Video cameras – used widely for urban
surveillance in Great Britain – offer security in exchange for
providing the state with ability to monitor movements and
behaviour.  With face-recognition software, it becomes possible
to track the movements of every human being as they walk down
the street (D’Elia & D’Ottavi, 2002).
And the current round of terrorist attacks have offered further
encouragement to law-abiding citizens to trust their governments
with ever increased powers of scrutiny. Vigorous debate goes on
in the US about the scope of this authority, from the Patriot Act,
the new ‘Office of Information Awareness’ (OIA), which is part of
Homeland Security Act and Operation TIPS (Terrorism
Information and Prevention System).  Despite this, the US has led
the way in giving federal officials greater powers to trace and
intercept communications both for law enforcement and foreign
intelligence purposes (The Economist, 2002: 33; Doyle, 2002;
Holtzman, 2003).
Director of the National Security Agency, Lt. General Michael
V. Hayden, told US Congress that they could best help him by
“going back to their constituents and finding out where the public
wants to draw the line between liberty and safety” (Hayden, 2002).
In the November 2002 elections, US voters appear to have given
carte blanche to the Bush administration to draw the line where it
wants – so long as they can sleep safely in their beds.
Of course, the use of IT is not just a one way street, cordoned
off by the state and major corporations.  There is also the obvious
value of IT in enabling a terrorist attack: cell phones were used in
the co-ordination of the attacks of 11 September, and to detonate
the Bali bombs.
And then there is the even more important use of ever-
cheaper, ever-more-powerful information technologies to mobilise
constituencies, from Al Qaeda’s recruitment videos, to the new,
unregulated satellite TV channels—notably Al Jazeera, founded
in 1996— which are given an important role in the propaganda
war between the US and Al Qaeda. The uncomfortable fact is that
an unfettered media often “fuels antagonisms because people
choose channels that bolster their biases” (Wright, 2002).
Asia’s Clampdown – the cudgel and the stiletto
In Southeast Asia, the surveillance and interception of
communications continues with impunity.  Even Echelon is
reported to be in action gleaning information from America’s allies
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in the region (Hager, N., 1986, Secret Power, cited in Simbulan, 2000).
Not that those allies have been slow to do their bit in the war on
‘terror’.  Malaysia and Singapore have arrested nearly 40 alleged
Islamic militants since December 2001, most of whom are reported
to have admitted belonging to JI (Shari, et al, 2002: 22).
In Malaysia, there are plans to tighten security laws after a
judge ordered the release of an Islamic militant suspect, even though
he was immediately re-arrested.  A minister in the Prime Minister’s
department Rais Yatim, told the New Sunday Times newspaper the
government was thinking of tightening the Internal Security Act
(ISA), which allows indefinite detention without trial (BBC, 2002a).
The Philippines welcomed the help of US Special Forces in its
battle against Muslim radicals in the south of the archipelago, and
is considering a controversial identity card scheme (Baguiro, 2002:
A1).  Even Indonesia, slow to jump aboard given obvious conflicting
internal interests, moved to arrest the alleged spiritual leader of JI,
Abu Bakar Bashir, after the Bali Bombings.
There have been few questions raised against the clampdown,
suggesting that some of the ‘evidence’ from Malaysian and
Indonesian security agencies looks to have been manufactured for
domestic political and diplomatic purposes, further “alienating an
already sceptical Islamic community” (Arkin, 2002).  But, where
once the West might have argued the human rights agenda with
Southeast Asia’s authoritarian governments, now that its assets are
threatened, it has been unusually quiet.
As for the local response, in Singapore, at least, there is little in
the way of public outcry to the State’s policies. Singapore’s uncertain
beginnings have given rise to a political culture “founded on
political indifference mixed with high anxiety,” and a middle class
which does not demand a pluralist society, given that  “…the
selective cultivation of tradition high cultural values and passivity
and group conformity, and their subsequent promulgation through
universal education programs militate against individualism, the
rule of law and critical public debate” (Jones, 1998: 163).
While it is not possible to tar the hole of Southeast Asia’s
citizenry with Singapore’s cultural brush, most elements of pluralist
democracy in the region have only emerged recently.  Where the
Southeast Asian state has not been technologically sophisticated in
its surveillance, or its citizenry too unconnected to be electronically
monitored, the military has often taken a more direct role in support
of the surveillance state (Jones & Smith, 2002: 147).
Besides, memories of the chaos that infected their post-
independence years are still fresh, and the stalwart burghers of
Southeast Asia are all too happy to allow their rulers to draw a far
more ambiguous line between liberty and safety. Whether these
elites can provide the security their citizenry so desperately desire
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remains to be seen.   Few outside the region have much confidence
that ASEAN will step up to the breach, given that regional co-
operation in countering terrorism in the past has “not been well
co-ordinated and has continued to be ad hoc due to the constraints
of conflicting national interests and mutual suspicions” (Chan,
2002: 107).
Consideration of the political economy of the communication
media has provided a useful analysis of structures of ownership
and control, as well as charting developments such as the growth
of the media, the extension of corporate control, and convergence
within the industry.  Any understanding of the unfolding events
in Southeast Asia, however, shows that a more nuanced approach
is necessary, one that takes into account those who challenge the
centres of power, whether inside institutions, countries or regions.
Likewise, it is important to include their audiences and the
technology itself, as analysing the way that “meaning is made and
remade through the concrete activities of producers and consumers
is … essential” (Golding & Murdock, 1996: 15).
As Kellner suggests, the media it is not a tool of monolithic
capitalist ideology, but “a synthesis of capitalist and democratic
structures and imperatives and is therefore full of structural
conflicts and tensions” (Kellner, 1990: 15).   There is an ongoing
struggle for the use and control of IT and for the space the new
media, in particular, creates.  There is an understanding in the
region of the unique ability of the modern communication media
to influence the daily construction of reality, and the assumptions
that underpin it, those who might profit from its economic, political
and cultural influence. Thus, the perspectives of technological
determinism, cultural studies and the ideas of Thompson and
Giddens, also form a valuable element of the warp and weave of
the fabric of our understanding impact of IT and the
communications media, as well as of the unintended consequences
of technology.
Indeed, while the war on ‘terror’ is giving hardliners in
Southeast Asia the backing they need to try to clamp down further
on dissent within their communities, these actions will only serve
to further undermine their own positions.  Events post 9/11 have
indicated that governments around the region need to allow more
critical engagement with issues that are threatening regime
continuity around the region, in particular the challenge that
militant Islam represents to stability in Pacific Asia.
The limited coverage of alternative perspectives by the mass
media, partly because of their preparedness to bow to local controls
and partly because of a process of dumbing-down, clearly played
Conclusion
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a role in the failure of both Singapore and neighbouring Malaysia
to recognise the extent of the coherence and cohesion of the
politically radicalised Islamic opposition in their own backyard.
There are no signs of a more liberal attitude.
Rapid technological change in areas such as the development
of broadband telecommunication services in East Asia is leading to
more “complex bargaining relationships” (Langdale, 1997: 128)
between global companies, local firms, citizens and their national
governments.  Around the region, “new responses to these
technologies will be and are being crafted not only by the state, but
also the media and society” (Ooi, 2000: 192).  But, all too often, any
liberalisation of freedom of expression is driven from above, and
“democratisation thus involves the expansion of political
participation and consultation within the limits defined by the
state…” (Jones, 1995: 84).
The avenues through which the dispossessed and
disenfranchised can vent their unease are increasingly choked. The
region’s governments are inflexible on this point, even though their
embrace of globalisation has given rise to groups which clearly
believe their only resort is “a rabid response to colonialism and
imperialism and their economic children capitalism and modernity”
(Barber, 1995: 11). Control remains their strategy – even if it is a
flawed one. The bombing in Bali in October 2002, has only served
to harden their resolve.
We are witness to an unfolding drama around Southeast Asia.
It is nothing less than the disenchantment of this world and the end
of Southeast Asia’s ‘Age of Deference’, encouraged by the ideas
carried by a globalised media and realised by the same
communications technology upon which the media, itself, relies.
As change and conflict lead to inevitable destruction, it remains to
be seen just how widespread this will be, and what shape the
region’s institutions will take.  Given the continued strategic
importance of the region, the US, in particular, is likely to show
particular interest.  The last time Southeast Asia suffered serious
internal instability, in the years following WWII, the US played a
major role in drawing the region’s political map.  Interference this
time is likely to drive more of Asia’s disaffected youth into the hands
of hard-liners like JI and Al Qaeda, and hasten the demise of
Southeast Asia’s surveillance states.
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